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COMMENT
The New Criminal Deposition Statute
in Ohio -Help or Hindrance to Justice?
Marian F. Ratnoff*
FOR 39 DAYS, the 78-year-old victim of an assault lay in a Cleve-
land hospital in critical condition. On the 40th day, she died.'
Two months after the assault, two men were arrested and indicted
by the grand jury on two counts of first-degree murder in the perpe-
tration of a robbery.' The accused men alleged that they had never
been confronted by the victim, that they had never been placed in
a lineup or identified, and indeed, that grave doubt existed as to
whether the assault had caused the elderly woman's death.'
Learning that the State was holding several material witnesses
alleged to be accomplices of the men, court-appointed counsel
sought to depose them and several other persons, concededly for the
sole purpose of pretrial discovery of relevant facts.4 Counsel acted
under the authority of a newly amended statute, section 2945.50 of
the Ohio Revised Code,5 which grants both prosecution and defend-
ant the right to take the deposition of any witness in a criminal case
if commissioned by the court. In the name of Jackman, a police
officer and one of the proposed deponents, the prosecuting attorney
STiM AuTHoR: MLARLA F. RATNoFF (B.A., University of Chicago; M.A. and
J.D., Western Reserve University) is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of ROBERT J. CRUMP in the preparation
of this article for publication.
I Brief for Appellant at 2, State ex re. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio
St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
2 Id. at 3.
RId.
4Id.
GOMIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1966), which became effective
October 13, 1965, proclaims:
At any time after an issue of fact is joined upon an indictment, information,
or an affidavit, the prosecution or the defendant may apply in writing to the
court in which such indictment, information, or affidavit is pending for a
commission to take the depositions of any witness. The court or a judge
thereof may grant such commission and make an order stating in what man-
ner and for what length of time notice shall be given to the prosecution or
to the defendant, before such witness shall be examined.
Cf. the Vermont criminal deposition statute in note 19 infra.
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sought a writ from the court of appeals prohibiting the trial judge
from allowing the deposition to proceed.6
The court of appeals not only granted the prohibitive writ, but
also held that the involved statute was unconstitutional.7 The ap-
pellate court traced the history of the statute, pointing out that depo-
sition legislation was intended originally to permit depositions to
be taken by defendants to perpetuate testimony and that subsequent
revisions of the law were intended only to extend this same right to
the State.8 In viewing the development of pretrial discovery, the
court discussed the 1912 constitutional amendment concerning dep-
ositions, which was the ancestor of section 2945.50.9 After inter-
preting the minutes of the 1912 constitutional convention regarding
the deposition enactment, the court explained that "there was no
thought [by the 1912 legislatorsl of broadening the right of either
party in a criminal case to take depositions for the purpose of pre-
trial discovery."'" The court then observed that the constitutional
power to enact pretrial discovery legislation "is clearly limited to
taking testimony that cannot otherwise be preserved for presentation
upon the trial of the case on the merits where a witness will not in
all reasonable probability be then available . . . ."" Therefore,
since the legislature cannot exceed its constitutional grant of power,
section 2945.50 "is unconstitutional insofar as it provides for tak-
ing depositions of witnesses who can be called to testify upon the
trial of a criminal case on the merits."' 2  The appellate court fur-
ther concluded that section 2945.50 is so permissive that the trial
court is given an "absolute, uncontrolled discretion" to determine
when a deposition can be taken, which results in a wrongful delega-
tion of legislative powers -to the courts.'3
The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed sharply with its appellate
brethren. 4 Accepting the challenge that the statute was unconsti-
6 State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d
906 (1967). After a hearing, defense counsel's application for a commission to take
depositions was granted by the trial judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas. Id.
7 State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 6 Ohio App. 2d 182, 186-87,
217 N.E.2d 251, 254-55 (1966), rev'd, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
8 6 Ohio App. 2d at 185, 217 N.E.2d at 253.
9 Ohio Gen. Code § 13.444-11 (1912).
10 6 Ohio App. 2d at 185, 217 N.E.2d at 253-54.
11 Id. at 186, 217 N.E.2d at 254.
12Id. at 187, 217 N.E.2d at 255.
13 Id. at 186, 217 N.E.2d at 254.
14 State ex tel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.
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rational, the arguments of the lower court were carefully refuted.
In contrast to the appellate court's reading of the 1912 constitu-
tional convention minutes, the supreme court concluded that the
"delegates desired to give the state an equal privilege, and yet they
were deeply concerned with the accused's long-recognized right of
confrontation which they wished to preserve in its pristine force."' 5
Further, "[ilt is clear that the range of inquiry [at the conventioni
was the use of depositions by the state at trial. They did not con-
sider the question of discovery depositions."'" Hence, since the
supreme court could find no dear prohibition against pretrial dis-
covery in the Ohio constitution and since the legislative provisions
of section 2945.50 and the constitution were not incompatible, the
fact was inescapable that the court of appeals had erred.' 7
Thus, in 1967, with the holding of constitutionality in State ex
rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas,'8 Ohio becomes one of two
States in the nation to allow criminal depositions for other than the
most circumscribed reasons.'9 How far the State of Ohio has trav-
elled in allowing this privilege to be so expanded becomes manifest
when the new statute is contrasted with State v. Rhoads,2" a 1910
Ohio case, which has for many years been a leading expression of
the law's unwillingness to allow defendant and prosecutor to know
the substance of one another's case before trial.2 ' That the Jack-
man case has freed the Ohio criminal process of its hunter-hunted
2d 906 (1967), wherein the court stated, '"There is no dispute that [the statute] purports
to authorize a trial court to commission the taking of pretrial discovery depositions."
'5Id. at 165, 224 N.E.2d at 911.
16Id. at 166, 224 N.E.2d at 911.
17 Id. at 168, 224 N..2d at 913.
18 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
19 Vermont is the other State having a similar criminal deposition statute. It be-
came effective in 1961 and states:
A respondent in a criminal cause at any time after the filing cof an indictment,
information or complaint, may take the deposition of a witness, upon motion
and notice to the state and other respondents, and on showing that the wit-
ness's testimony may be material or relevant on the trial or of assistance in the
preparation of his defense, and upon such showing the court, a superior judge,
county court judge or district judge shall order that the testimony of the wit-
ness be taken by deposition. 5 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (Supp. 1967).
See also id. §§ 6722-27. Apparently, under the Vermont statute a defendant need
only show cause why he should be allowed to take depositions and an order must issue.
In Ohio, however, there is seemingly a great deal of discretion in the judge to determine
whether to allow the taking of depositions. Also, it is important to note that section
2945.50 applies to both prosecution and defendants, while the Vermont statute applies
only to defendants. See note 5 supra. See also notes 75-78 infra & accompanying text.
20 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910).
21 See, e.g., State v. Sharp, 162 Ohio St. 173, 122 N.E.2d 684 (1954); C. MCCOR-
lIcK, EVDENcB 210 & n.22 (1954).
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quality cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, this newly given right
foreshadows many problems, not the least of which will be the ex-
ploration by defense and prosecution of the outer reaches of the
criminal deposition.
Unfortunately, the State of Ohio rarely incorporates within its
statutes nor makes available any expression of the legislative intent
which produced a particular statute. In an informal interview,
22
Michael A. Sweeney of Cleveland, sponsor of the bill that was to
become the new statute, stated that it was the intent of the authors
of the bill to provide a new law which would be less rigid than the
old one.23 Like similar statutes in other States, the old law allowed
criminal depositions to be taken only where a witness might be ill
or dying, absent from the jurisdiction, or an out-of-State resident. 4
The emphatic concern of the bill's sponsors was that all of the Ohio
case law applicable to pretrial discovery be most carefully preserved.
Thus, the sponsors believed that on-the-scene statements secured by
police in the investigation of a crime, a defendant's confession or
statement, and any of the other fragments of the prosecutor's or
the defense attorney's work product should be most carefully pro-
tected. 5 Similarly, the legislators were definitely opposed to abro-
gation of any of the traditionally secret preserves of privilege, i.e.,
husband-wife, attorney-client, or doctor-patient.2" All of the old
standards were to be maintained. In the final analysis, Mr. Sweeney
remarked that permission to depose the witness will rest upon the
sound discretion of the -trial judge whose decision to grant or deny
the deposition will depend upon the strength of the reasons put for-
ward by either party.2
About 6 weeks after the Ohio Supreme Court handed down its
Jackman decision, a judge of the Cuyahoga County Court of Com-
mon Pleas indicated the factors which would influence his decision
in regard to applications for depositions. In a journal entry, he
2 2 Interview with Michael A. Sweeney, former member of the Ohio General As-
sembly, House of Representatives, member at large, in Cleveland, Ohio, May 5, 1967
[hereinafter cited as Sweeney Interview].
2 3 O-o REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 (Page 1954), as amended, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.50 (Page Supp. 1966).
24 Id. The older section stated:
When an issue of fact is joined upon an indictment and a material witness
for the state or the defendant is sick or infirm, or about to leave the state, or is
confined in prison, or resides out of this state, the prosecuting attorney or the
defendant may apply... to take the depositions of such witness.
25 Sweeney Interview.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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enunciated the rules to be followed in common pleas court by either
party seeking a deposition under section 2945.50: the parties are to
state the general nature of the information sought and the purpose
of the deposition; the deposition may not be sought for the purpose
of harassing individuals or delaying trial; the names and addresses
of each witness must be given; if the proposed deponent is a police
officer, he must be designated by rank and badge number.2"
Apparently, however, guidelines have not 'been altogether help-
ful. For instance, in a Cuyahoga County criminal case an 8-year-old
girl, a victim of a felonious assault, was deposed and thereby forced
to recount a terrifying experience. The 53-year-old defendant,
charged with two counts of felonious assault on her, sat across the
table as she was questioned.2" While the efficacy of allowing the
deposition can be questioned, the prosecutor did not blame the judge
who was unsure as to the requirements of the law and the limits of
his discretion. The prosecutor stated, "'Although the law leaves
the granting of depositions -to the judge's discretion, no useful guide-
lines have been set down ... . I certainly can not blame [the judge)
.... But I must aim a million dollars of criticism at the law.' "so
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has suggested that civil
guidelines are available to the presiding judge in trials of criminal
causes, 1 these court rules offer minimal guidance, at best, to inter-
ested parties. Taking a deposition - either civil or criminal - is
not without complex problems. Perhaps because of the complexi-
ties of the procedure, many States appear unalterably opposed to
Ohio's stand for what appear to be sound reasons.
In contrast to Ohio, New Jersey recently reaffirmed that its rules
of court would not permit pretrial depositions. 2 In denying a de-
fendant compulsory process to obtain the examination of certain
witnesses, the court set forth its belief that the majority of the States
were correct in not allowing depositions in criminal cases."3 The
2 8 Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Perry B. Jackson set down the
guidelines for use in the Cuyahoga County criminal courts. Cleveland Plain Dealer,
May 6, 1967, at 7, col. 6.
29 Cleveland Press, Nov. 7, 1967, at 12, col. 1.
30 ld.
819 Ohio St. 2d at 167, 224 N.B.2d at 912.
32 State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966). For a discussion of criminal
discovery in Indiana and other States, see Orfield, Criminal Discovery in Indiana, 1
IND. LEGAL F. 117 (1967).
33 47 N.J. at 354, 221 A.2d at 13. In State v. Tate, the court was not convinced
that the right to discovery by use of depositions in criminal cases was helpful to the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. Indeed, depositions might tend to encumber the crim-
inal process. Id. at 356, 221 A.2d at 14-15. However, the court did not preclude
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court buttressed its stand by noting that even California, which tra-
ditionally has had liberal discovery procedures in criminal cases,
does not allow the taking of depositions."
In general, States allow criminal depositions because of non-
residence, expected absence from the jurisdiction, inability to find
the witness in the jurisdiction despite the exercise of due diligence,
illness or physical disability, or impending death.35 Wherever dep-
ositions have been sought for purposes other than those enunciated
above, various opposing arguments have been advanced. In New
Jersey's State v. Tune,36 the court observed that "long experience
has taught the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest
fact finding, but on the contrary to perjury and suppression of evi-
dence."37  In addition, the threat of possible intimidation or bribery
of prospective witnesses looms menacingly in pretrial discovery."8
In State v. Rhoads,39 a now rejected Ohio decision, -the court added
a further objection that pretrial discovery is a one-way street run-
ning in the defendant's favor.4" The Ohio court asked, with some
petulance, "[W]hy should -the accused be allowed to rummage
through the private papers of the prosecuting attorney? Neither
the sublime teachings of the Golden Rule . . . nor the supposed
future legislative or judicial action in regard to the problem: "As we have said, we have
no experience of our own to draw upon. Perhaps the experience in the State of Ver-
mont [and now presumably Ohio] which alone permits discovery, can shed light on how
we would fare." Id at 356-57, 221 A.2d at 15.
34 Id. at 354, 221 A.2d at 13. California Supreme Court Justice Traynor seems
to -feel, however, that criminal discovery should be increased. He has said: "In criminal
litigation ... there is continuing resistance to pretrial discovery, the more formidable
because it has not only the force of law and habit, but also the force of adrenal reaction
against seemingly plausible menaces. The most cogent arguments for change encounter
that resistance." Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 228 (1964).
3 5 Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 768 (1955).
36 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953). The reasoning of State v. Tune was partially
rejected in State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
37 13 N.J. at 210, 98 A.2d at 884.
381d.
39 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910). Ono REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.50 (Page
Supp. 1966) would seem to render the Rhoads decision nugatory. See also text accom-
panying note 20 supra.
40 81 Ohio St. at 397, 91 N.E. at 192. Any fears which the court had in 1910
about the "one-way street" were obliterated by the constitutional amendment passed in
1912 and embodied in OHIO CONST. art. I, 5 10, which was designed to give the State
and the defendant an equal right to take depositions for use at criminal trials, for certain
circumscribed reasons. The constitutional convention did not consider the use of dis-
covery depositions, as embodied in section 2945.50. 9 Ohio St. 2d at 165-66, 224
N.E.2d at 911.
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sense of fair play can be so perverted as to sanction the demands
allowed in this case."41
The dassic observation of Judge Learned Hand sums up an-
other objection to criminal discovery in general, i.e., the undue ad-
vantage given the defendant.
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, [the defen-
dant] need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is
immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any
one of the twelve .... Our dangers do not lie in too little ten-
derness to the accused .... What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats
the prosecution of crime. 2
Various judges and legal writers have, however, refuted the tra-
ditional arguments. When Mr. Justice Brennan sat as a judge of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, he castigated fellow judges for
their opinion in State v. Tune;
That old hobgoblin perjury, invariably raised with every suggested
change in procedure to make easier the discovery of truth, is again
disinterred from the grave where I had thought it was forever
buried under the overwhelming weight of the complete rebuttal
supplied by our experience in civil causes where liberal discovery
has been allowed.43
A leading legal writer commenting upon depositions in civil causes,
emphasized as Mr. Justice Brennan had, that civil depositions, far
from encouraging perjury, were a great preventive.44 Further, a
student writer commenting on the threat of intimidation in civil
depositions advances the belief that bullying tactics and improper
questioning can be eliminated by protective orders issued by the
court.45 The Ohio Supreme Court made a similar observation in
the Jackman case.4
41 81 Ohio St. at 425, 91 N.E. at 196; see Note, Pretrial Criminal Discovery: The
Need for Expansion, 35 U. GIN. L. REv. 195 (1966).
42
'United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
43 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 227, 98 A.2d 881, 894 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
44 Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863
(1933). The author maintained that in civil causes "[t]he party is examined early,
while his memory is fresh, before he has had time to work up a protective scheme of
fictitious circumstances, and while it is still comparatively easy to check up on his testi-
mony to ascertain how far it may vary from the truth." Id. at 872.
45 Note, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE
L.J. 117 (1949).
469 Ohio St. 2d at 167, 224 N.E.2d at 912.
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Finally, in answer to the one-way street argument and "undue
advantage" protagonists, one writer attacks the position that the
State and the accused are equal adversaries; "The average defendant
can rarely, if ever, approach the power and resources of the prosecu-
tion."47
Although the philosophical arguments run pro and con with
equal ferocity, unquestionably, the ability to take a criminal deposi-
tion raises practical problems which are not easily refuted. To be-
gin, there is the problem of freezing the testimony of a witness. It
is certainly true in civil depositions, which are our only source of
experience at present, that an attorney very often takes a deposition
not only to find out what a witness will say but also to pin down
his story." Although the sponsors of section 2945.50 were dearly
opposed to the use of the statute for fishing purposes,49 there is no
guarantee that it will not be so employed. Here the discretion of
the trial judge will be crucial. Ohio civil case law seems to oppose
any attempts to obtain extremely remote information"0 and thus,
the trial judge must carefully distinguish such attempts from sin-
cere desires to depose witnesses in order to prepare a solid case. Al-
though the argument could be made that to grant a judge such wide
discretion to determine the occasion for granting a right given by
statute is judicial legislation, it has been observed that where the
right is intimately associated with the judicial procedure, the judge
cannot be accused of attempting to be a legislator."'
Fortunately, since the Ohio statute grants the deposition priv-
ilege to both State and defendant, it avoids one problem inherent in
frozen testimony. For instance, if only the defense is allowed to
depose witnesses, much of the prosecution's case will be frozen,
thereby affording the defense an opportunity to arrange its case so
as to directly refute the prosecution's frozen testimony at trial. But,
because of the equal right to take the witnesses' testimony before
47 Garber, Criminal Discovery, 15 W. RES. L. REv. 495,497-98 (1964).
48 Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293, 311
(1960).
49 Sweeney Interview, supra note 22.
50 9 Ohio St. 2d at 167, 224 N.E.2d at 912; see Ornstein v. Chesapeake & O.R.RI,
36 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937), appeal dismissed, 133 Ohio St. 385, 13 N.E.2d
909 (1938). In the federal system, "fishing" or attempting to secure remote informa-
tion, is not a valid argument to discredit discovery procedures, because discovery is of
equal value to both sides. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Pike & Wil-
lis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CM. L. REV. 297, 303 (1940).
51 Brief for Appellant at 20-21, State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas,
9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
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trial under section 2945.50, neither side can profitably arrange its
story in an effort to refute a particular segment of testimony with-
out suffering a similar rearrangement of facts by the opposition.
Although frozen testimony may be clarified, explained, or softened
by the introduction of mitigating facts, the opportunity to withhold
information is not as great as it might be where either side hears
testimony for the first time in open court. This is not to say, how-
ever, that witnesses who after being given notice52 that a deposition
is to be taken cannot be coached.
Coaching is the ghost which hovers over every lawsuit, civil or
criminal. Like the skeleton in the closet it is not discussed and is
generally unseen but its rattling is frequently heard. Nevertheless,
author Edson Sunderland, who recognized the possibility in civil
cases, believes that coaching a witness in preparation for a deposi-
tion is less common -than coaching before a trial and thus, testimony
taken at deposition is apt to be less rehearsed than testimony given
at trial.53 Only experience with the new Ohio statute will indicate
whether coaching will destroy the obvious intent of the statute to
make the truth less difficult to capture.54
One interesting consequence of the use of criminal depositions
will be its potential virtue or vice in impeaching a witness. Section
2945.54 of the Ohio Revised Code,55 directs that where criminal
discovery is sought, the same requirements which exist in civil dis-
covery shall govern. In civil depositions, nothing limits their use
for purposes of impeachment of any witness at the trial of any ac-
tion.5" In a perceptive essay on the consequences of the Miranda v.
Arizona57 decision, author Stanley Kent 5 observes that despite the
prohibitions against the use of an illegal confession to convict an
accused, nothing in the Court's opinion abrogates nor weakens the
impeachment rules forged in IWalder v. United States59 and its prog-
5 2 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.54 (Page 1954), provides that examination of
witnesses shall be taken in the same manner as that for taking depositions under id. §§
2319.05-.31. Id. § 2319.15 provides for written notice of intent to take a deposition
except where it is to be taken under special commission. Although the criminal statute
requires application to the criminal court for a commission to take a deposition, it does
not appear to be a special commission.
5 3 Sunderland, supra note 44, at 872.
5- Sweeney Interview, supra note 22.
55 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.54 (Page 1954).
561d. § 2319.45 (Page Supp. 1966).
57 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58 Kent, Miranda v. Arizona - The Use of Inadmissible Evidence for Impeach-
raent Purposes, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1177 (1967).
59 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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eny.60 Thus, Kent argues that an otherwise inadmissable confes-
sion can be used for impeachment purposes provided it touches
upon collateral matters and does not go to the heart of the indict-
ment.6 By analogy, is not the same conclusion available in regard
to the use of criminal depositions where a showing of coercion and
illegality of procedure would be harder to make than in a confession
case? Nothing prevents an attorney for either side from showing a
discrepancy between what a witness says in court and what he says
on deposition. As Kent points out in regard to the use of the con-
fession for impeachment purposes, even an exculpatory statement
becomes a "powerful weapon" in the hands of the opposition in dis-
crediting a witness.62
Additional dangers in the use of the criminal deposition lie in
the possibility that either side may use the process -to indulge in
malicious or overextended questioning. It is possible, as one writer
has commented, for a clever attorney to set forth a series of ques-
tions which individually may not be so improper as to allow the
depondent the right to refuse to answer, but which may have the
cumulative effect of constituting bullying tactics.63 Yet, the right to
have one's lawyer present at the taking of a deposition offers a de-
gree of protection against the possibility of unearthing collateral
material.64 Once again, only experience will demonstrate whether
the statute is to be used or abused.
Not to be overlooked is the threat of delay which is omnipres-
ent in the use of depositions. Where an individual or his attorney
objects to answering an alledgedly improper question, much time
can be lost in securing a ruling from a judge. Exactly to the point
is the experience in the courtroom of the very judge who promul-
gated the first deposition rules enunciated in Cuyahoga County.6"
A newspaper report of this first attempt to use the deposition statute
after the Jackman decision relates: "After a morning game of 'I
object' between the prosecutor and defense attorney, Common Pleas
60 Kent, supra note 58, at 1179.
61Id. at 1179-80.
62Id. at 1180. The author points out that an exculpatory statement by an accused
given before trial often contains collateral material that can be used by the prosecutor to
attack the accused's credibility, thereby making his statement inculpatory. Id. at 1179-
80.
63 Note, supra note 45, at 136. Such a cumulative effect would result if in'formation
potentially harmful to the deponent if revealed to third parties was unearthed. Id.
6 4 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.52 (Page 1954).
65 Reference is to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Perry B. Jackson. See
notes 28-30 supra & accompanying text.
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Judge Perry B. Jackson halted proceedings and ordered both sides
to file further briefs."6 More than a dozen objections were raised
in a short span of time. When witnesses were ordered to answer
questions by the court-assigned commissioner and they refused to do
so, all parties would proceed to the presiding judge's courtroom to
obtain a ruling on the propriety of the question. 7 Obviously, since
the new statute does not require that the deposition be taken in the
presence of a judge, 6 this early experience emphasizes the possibili-
ties for delay and procrastination while attorneys learn how to han-
dle the new legal tool. Caustically, experience suggests that law-
yers will continue to use delaying tactics when it is to their client's
advantage even after the profession has become familiar with the
technique.
Depositions are often costly proceedings. Yet, justice requires
that the deposition right be afforded the indigent defendant; the
question then arises as to who must bear the cost of the deposition.
Since the Gideon v. Wainiwright"9 decision, the cost of supplying
counsel to indigents has seemingly become a major factor in our le-
gal system."0 Having to pay for depositions which an indigent de-
fendant may desire could cast an unbearable financial burden upon
the State.71 Thus, there remains a vital question concerning the
deposition privilege: Will an indigent be denied the valuable right
to depose witnesses because of his inability to pay?
Finally, whatever the defects of criminal depositions, the pro-
cedure has obvious value to both sides simply because it furnishes
an opportunity to observe and appraise the demeanor of adversary
66 Cleveland Press, May 12, 1967, at 8, col. 3.
671d.
60 O1O REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.54 (Page 1954) directs that depositions be taken
in accordance with id. § 2319.05 which allows a deposition to be heard before a judge
or clerk of the supreme court, the appeals court, the common pleas court, or before a
notary public or public stenographer. Judge Perry B. Jackson, the judge who issued
the first deposition rules in Cuyahoga County, stated that he had commissioned a court
reporter to take the deposition in the case. Interview with Perry B. Jackson, Judge of
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, in Cleveland, Ohio, May 15, 1967.
69 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
70 The State auditor of Ohio, Roger Cloud, has recently said that because of the
Supreme Court decisions allowing indigents the right of counsel and the right to obtain
free transcripts of court records, the State's share in prosecuting indigent defendants has
risen from less than $100,000 in 1952 to nearly $1 million in 1967. Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Dec. 7, 1967, at 41, col. 1.
"'See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.53-.54 (Page 1954). It would seem that
most indigent defendants would take advantage of section 2945.50, but in Cuyahoga
County it has apparently only been used about 20 times. Interview with the Cuyahoga
County Official Court Reporter, in Cleveland, Ohio, Dec. 9, 1967.
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witnesses. Further, the virtue of eliminating the possibility of with-
held or surprise testimony cannot be gainsaid. In Brady v. Mary-
land,72 Mr. Justice Douglas decried the prosecutor who withholds
evidence which could be exculpatory for the accused. The injus-
tice of allowing the prosecution to be the architect of a proceeding
and to shape a trial by choosing to put forth or withhold evidence
and, by analogy, testimony, does not comport with standards of jus-
tice. 3  In addition, the criminal deposition statute is of value to the
State, which will no longer have to suffer the adverse effect of the
withholding of evidence by the defendant.
Perhaps the value of criminal deposition legislation is best illus-
trated by the Vermont experience. Similar to section 2945.50, the
Vermont statute only provides for the defendant's right to take dep-
ositions and has been in effect since 1961."7 Recently, a survey of
the State's defense counsel, judges, and prosecutors was undertaken
to determine if in fact the use of criminal depositions was benefi-
dal.5 The results indicated that most are pleased with the statute,
its greatest value appearing to be the decrease in the likelihood of
trial. Apparently, the decrease results from the defendant's ability
to determine the rudiments of the case from firsthand knowledge
rather than from mere conjecture as was often true before the stat-
ute was enacted."8  In conjunction with the above, the bluffing ele-
ment was also removed77 Thus, as a result of using depositions,
defense counsel and the prosecution have been encouraged to work
out a solution to the criminal charge and to place greater emphasis
on rehabilitating the individual involved. Perhaps the greatest im-
petus for other States considering expanded criminal deposition leg-
islation is the statement that, in Vermont, "after more than five
years of practice under these statutes... [there has not been] a sin-
gle dissent calling for the return of the old law, either by a prose-
cutor, a judge or a defense counsel ....
72 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
73 Id. at 88.
74 Note 19 supra.
75 Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967).
7 6 Id. at 733-34. The reasons given for the taking of deposition were: "(1) general
discovery, (2) the tying of a witness to a particular story, (3) an attempt to present for-
malized facts to indicate to the prosecutor the weakness in his case, and (4) an attempt
to present formalized facts to show a defendant the nature and strength of the state's
case." Id. at 733.
77Id. at 733-34.
78 Id. at 734. A reason for the success of the statute seems to be that Vermont has
CRIMINAL DEPOSITION STATUTE
There is no question that police prosecutors in Ohio are deeply
disturbed by the new statute." However, the sponsor of the bill
believes that their fears are not justified and that time and experi-
ence will demonstrate the value of the statute.8"
To the doubters, however, the words of author Robert L.
Fletcher are mollifying.8" He points out that the use of pretrial
discovery in civil cases has not had disastrous consequences. Our
judicial system has achieved substantial justice despite the specter of
perjury. If the factual minutiae are available to opposing counsel,
a more reliable picture of what truly occurred will evolve.' A
Pennsylvania judge once observed that the modern concept of a
trial is an inquiry by rational means into the truth about disputed
fact which requires that all rational legitimate means of finding out
what happened be available."3 If a client comes to an attorney with
a $100 damage claim because someone has crumpled his car's fender
in a parking lot, depositions can be taken freely without having to
ask for permission. Is justice not strained when a similar right is de-
nied a man who may lose not $100 but his life? Those who view a
trial as the quest for truth will accept the deposition power, realizing
its strengths and weaknesses, yet striving to learn how to use it.
Those who view a trial as a combat between the State and the ac-
cused in which only the cunning can triumph will be inconsolable.
a small lawyer population, who have traditionally followed an "open file" policy. Id.
at 732-33.
79 Sweeney Interview, supra note 22. Concerning the deposing of the 8-year-old
victim of a felonious assault, notes 29-30 supra & accompanying text, the prosecutor
stated, "'It was pathetic, the way she broke down.... The trial would be enough of an
ordeal." Cleveland Press, Nov. 7, 1967, at 12, col. 1.
80 Sweeney Interview, supra note 22.
81 Fletcher, supra note 48, at 310-11.
82 Id.
83 Commonwealth v. Stepper, 54 Lack. Jut. 205, 211 (Lack. County Ct. 1952).
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